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Abstract 
The period from the 1960s to c. 2000 saw a dramatic change in retail banking technology in 
Hong Kong. Initially the relevant technologies were installed and managed within the 
boundaries of large banks (such as HSBC). But over the course of the period covered by this 
article, the industrial organization of the relevant technologies transformed to include 
provision outsourced to non-bank institutions. This paper seeks to account for this shift in the 
organization of computer technology. Specifically, the paper compares the adoption of 
computers at HSBC in the 1960s and 1970s with a micro-payments solution called 
“Octopus”, which was developed in the 1990s by a consortium that excluded financial firms 
thanks to the development in depth and breadth of an epistemic community of computer 
professionals and computer-literate managers in Hong Kong.  Our thinking in doing this 
comparison was influenced by the theory of the firm as epistemic community. 
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1 Introduction 
The term “cashless society” was originally coined in the United States in the mid-
1950s to describe a future in which electronic transactions had replaced the use of coins, 
cheques, and banknotes as media of exchange.1 A 1966 newspaper article introduced this 
concept to people in Hong Kong.2 In the last half century, some societies have evolved 
towards in this direction, although paper notes and coins are still used in even the most 
cashless economies, such as Sweden and Iceland.3  The displacement of cash with other 
payment solutions is an important topic in the histories of computing and banking: without 
the digitalization of customer accounts on the back of the adoption of mainframe computers 
by banks in the 1960s and 1970s, the subsequent moves in the direction of cashlessness 
would not have been possible.  
Although historians have published extensively on the adoption of computers by 
European and North American banks,4 they have published far less on the computerisation of 
East Asian financial institutions.5 This article helps to fill this gap by exploring the history of 
retail banking technology in Hong Kong from the 1960s to the present. Although Hong Kong 
banks lagged behind their American and British peers in computerisation in the 1960s, they 
rapidly caught up and were early adopters of technologies such as ATMs, telephone banking, 
and Internet banking. In the early 1970s, Roy Victor Munden, a visionary Hong Kong bank 
executive discussed the possibility that cooperation between banks and other firms might 
eventually allow the Crown Colony to evolve into a cashless society.6 Today, Hong Kong’s 
Octopus system is one of the world’s most advanced systems of cashless payments.7  
Through the examination of two episodes in Hong Kong’s computing history, this 
article indicates how the industrial organization and knowledge base that structured retail 
banking technology in Hong Kong transformed between the 1960s and the early 2000s.  
In the early stages of computerization of retail financial markets, most higher level 
managers in banks had limited or no knowledge about computer systems although they were 
already deploying large computer systems on the principle of reducing back-office costs. 
Computerization predominantly took place by people who trained as bankers and within the 
boundaries of large corporations, particularly Hong Kong’s big commercial banks. During 
the more recent periods, however, there have come to be a greater diversity of approaches 
from which to choose when implementing a large application of computer technology in 
  
retail finance. This diversity has emerged to the extent that regulatory and technological 
change together with new forms to price risk reshaped retail financial markets. Some of these 
changes have enabled specific instances in which non-financial intermediaries take the lead in 
the innovative use of computer technology and successfully contest retail bank markets. For 
instance, the use of cellphones as cashpoints in Kenya.8 But relevant to the aims of this article 
is the inter-firm networks that enabled Octopus within Hong Kong’s retail payment system. 
To exemplify two stages in the adoption of computer technology in Asian retail banking, this 
article compares and contrasts the “internal” deployment of early computers at HSBC in the 
1960s and 1970s, with the “external” (i.e. non-bank or market) use of computers in micro-
payments (using the Octopus chip) in the 1990s and 2000s. By documenting these two 
episodes of technological change we indicate not only a dramatic transformation in the nature 
of the organisations responsible for the transformation of Hong Kong’s retail banking 
technology, but also how the institutional shift reflected changes in the nature of the 
knowledge related to computers. We describe these two episodes in sections 3 and 4. 
 
2 About Large Corporations and Epistemic Communities 
To compare and contrast the aforementioned two episodes of technological evolution 
we draw on the variant of the knowledge-based theory of the firm developed by Lars 
Håkanson in his work on the industrial organization of epistemic communities. For readers 
not familiar with his framework, we outline Håkanson’s concepts and show his views differ 
from the more established transaction-costs approach to understanding industrial organization 
pioneered by Oliver Williamson. Drawing on Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm, Williamson 
used transaction costs to explain why some activities are coordinated by markets while others 
take place within firm boundaries. In their view, high transaction costs are the primary reason 
why participants would replace the “invisible hand” of the market with managerial 
hierarchies.9 Williamson argued that transaction costs, and thus one’s preference for 
hierarchies over markets, are likely to be high if one or more of the following conditions is 
present: high asset specificity, thin markets, difficulties in negotiating and writing 
enforceable contracts, and asymmetric information between contracting parties. 
We agree that a Williamsonian approach is of some use in understanding the 
transition described in this article, as the relevant markets were quite “thin” in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere in the 1960s and 1970s. The relevant markets here are the markets for 
  
computers and the specialized skills needed to operate them. By “thin”, we mean there were 
an insufficient number of specialist vendors to make the market truly competitive. By the 
1980s, the markets for computer hardware and skills were much “thicker”, which contributed 
towards a shift towards the deployment of retail payment technologies in looser, inter-firm 
networks, such as the inter-firm network that developed Hong Kong’s Octopus system. The 
increasing thickness of markets often encourages firms to dis-integrate vertically and adopt 
other models for coordinating production, as thick markets make firms less susceptible to the 
so-called “hold up” problem.10  
However, transaction costs are only part of the explanation. Instead of using the ideas 
of Williamson, we draw on Lars Håkanson’s ideas about epistemic communities, which are 
much newer concepts in management research. Håkanson synthesizes the knowledge-based 
view (KBV) of the firm11 with Burkart Holzner’s work on the sociology of knowledge.12 In 
Håkanson’s work13, epistemic communities are systems that allow their members to interpret 
the world. Since individuals use multiple and layered frameworks to make sense of observed 
reality, we are all members of many epistemic communities. As an indiviual progresses from 
infancy through schooling and into an occupation, one joins various epistemic communities. 
Languages structure how their speakers think, and language communities are thus epistemic 
communities, albeit large ones that comprise everyone living in a community save for very 
small children. Smaller epistemic communities include the learned professions, skilled trades, 
industrial clusters and in some cases, as Håkanson14 documented, individual firms. Through 
the process of organizational learning, a firm can join an epistemic community. Within the 
boundaries of each of these more specialized epistemic communities, there is a unifying set 
of knowledge that includes common terminology, acceptance of other, non-linguistic 
conventions, and knowledge of how to perform particular productivity tasks. This shared 
knowledge permits a more advanced division of labour.   
Håkanson discusses articulation, the process by which tacit knowledge becomes 
“explicit” as standards and other tools (e.g., operating manuals or blueprints that can be 
shared with other firms). Articulation encompasses standardization and the development of 
technical jargon, or a common vocabulary precise enough to permit cooperation across firm 
boundaries (e.g., the intra-firm and international consensus about the exact physical 
characteristics of a credit card). It is difficult to have extensive outsourcing without some 
degree of articulation: articulation facilitates the division of labour. Closely associated with 
articulation in Håkanson’s framework is replication, which involves the transfer of 
  
knowledge and thus capabilities. In Håkanson’s view, articulation and replication facilitate 
the creation of “well defined, standardized interfaces between epistemic communities” which 
thereby “increase the feasibility of knowledge combinations through the uncomplicated 
transfer across epistemic boundaries of physical artefacts, such as blueprints or 
components.”15 
The boundaries of epistemic communities do not determine  industrial organization 
but they influence it.   Håkanson observes that “the cost of governing knowledge processes 
depends as much on the cognitive background of the exchange partners as on the tacitness of 
the knowledge.”16  In other words, it is more challenging to trade with an individual who is 
outside of most of one’s epistemic communities than with someone who is a member of most 
or all of the same epistemic communities. Whenever the boundaries of the relevant epistemic 
communities align perfectly with those of the individual firm, there will be a strong incentive 
for productive activity to be coordinated within the boundaries of the company, since 
transaction costs with outsiders are likely to be elevated. In contrast, epistemic communities 
“that span organization boundaries create and legitimize common codes and cognitive 
frames…” thereby facility the exchange of knowledge between organizations.17 The relative 
ease with which knowledge flows within epistemic communities changes transaction costs 
and thus influences  decisions about whether productive activities are to be done within the 
boundaries of a single organization or in looser “networks of practice”.18  
Members of several overlapping epistemic communities have managed the 
technologies that have facilitated the digitalization of retail banking over the last half century. 
Turning back to Hong Kong, when the first computer was installed in 1963, the computer-
literate population of the Crown Colony was confined to a handful of individuals. The 
epistemic community of computer literate-people consisted of just several small pools of 
talent, each confined to just a few firms. Within each firm, the information and 
communication technologies (ICT) professionals knew how to operate a single 
manufacturer’s proprietary hardware and software. The managers who supervised these 
professionals had only the most rudimentary computer literacy.  Digital systems for moving 
money were contained within the boundaries of individual banking firms. This meant, for 
instance, that terminals in the tellers of bank branches could communicate and exchange 
information with a mainframe in the head office, but not with computers in other firms. In the 
1970s, customers of a given Hong Kong bank could not use the cashpoints of another bank. 
Over the next few decades, the epistemic community of ICT professionals would grow 
  
rapidly as the proportion of Hong Kong adults who were computer-literate increased. As this 
epistemic community increased in depth (i.e. number of participants and diversity of 
specialisms), the pools of knowledge expanded and grew across the boundaries of firms to 
include many individuals in a wide range of firms.  
In the 1990s, firms as diverse as banks and public transport companies worked 
together to develop the Octopus network, the payments system that has helped Hong Kong 
people to reduce their usage of cash. This system then grew while working in cooperation 
with firms including convenience store and fast food restaurant chains. We argue that the 
inter-organization cooperation represented by the Octopus system was facilitated the prior 
emergence of two inter-firm epistemic communities in Hong Kong: ICT professionals 
capable of communicating across firm boundaries and computer-literate managers capable of 
supervising their professionals and communicating with their counterparts in other firms.  
The growth of common industrial standards and interoperable systems which contributed to 
the ability of firms to cooperate in the implementation of general-purpose computing 
technologies also enabled further progress in the transition towards cashlessness in Hong 
Kong.  
 
3 Episode 1: Internal Computerisation 
In this section we use one company, China Light and Power (CLP), to illustrate the 
situation before inter-organizational epistemic communities. The first organization in Hong 
Kong to acquire a computer was CLP, a local utility. It took delivery of an NCR315 system 
in late 1963 and then began experimenting with various applications of the technology. By 
1965, CLP was sending computer-generated bills to its customers.19 The Crown Colony’s 
second computer arrived at Hong Kong University in 1965.20 As late as 1965, experience 
with computers in Hong Kong was confined to just these two organizations. There is no 
evidence that these two organizations cooperated on solving computer problems or otherwise 
formed a single epistemic community of knowledge and practice. 
Hong Kong’s banks became interested in computers largely in response to the rapid 
expansion of their customer base. In the 1950s and 1960s, the proportion of Hong Kongers 
with bank accounts increased dramatically.21 By the mid-1960s, there was roughly one bank 
account for every person in Hong Kong.22  The growth of their retail basis posed major 
organizational and technological challenges for the colony’s banks which were forced to 
  
expand their retail branch networks.23  The challenges were particularly acute at HSBC, the 
colony’s largest bank. By early 1965, there were thirty-one HSBC retail branches and sub-
branches in Hong Kong.24 With a growing customer numbers, keeping track of balances 
became a cumbersome administrative process.  Speaking of this period, a retired HSBC 
executive later recalled that in some retail branches, the staff were required to stay at work 
“till ten, eleven o’clock at night a week at a time” to do all of the relevant calculations. He 
also remembered that these long hours had cost the bank significant sums in overtime.25 
Mechanization and later computerisation were among the bank’s responses to the 
problem of handling a rapidly growing number of transactions.26  In the 1950s, HSBC 
decided to replace traditional ledgers with National Cash Register (NCR)’s new Post-Tronic 
system for keeping track of customer accounts.27 HSBC’s managers appear to have become 
aware of the importance of computers to banking at an internal conference in 1958 at which a 
they discussed an NCR brochure about bank automation.28 Computers were then adopted 
during the leadership of Sir John Anthony Holt Saunders (1917-2002).29  As chief executive 
of the bank between 1962 and 1972, Saunders came to regard computerisation as vital for the 
future of the bank. Saunders’s interest seems to have developed after a visit to the United 
States in the mid-1960s, where he met with US bank presidents. Saunders was repeatedly 
asked about HSBC’s use of computers but was unable to say much in response to these 
enquiries as HSBC did not yet have any computers. Saunders returned to Hong Kong 
impressed with the need to keep up to date with US banks.30 It should be noted that HSBC 
had recently expanded into the US market and was also facing increasing competition in Asia 
from Chase Manhattan, a US bank. 31 
Title: Sir John Anthony Holt (“Jake”) Saunders, 1917-2002 (chief manager from 1962; 
chairman HSBC, 1964-1972) 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (n/d)32 
  
 
Saunders appears to have known little about computers, which he referred to as 
“bloody things.”33 He nevertheless understood that computers were important and was 
willing to authorise considerable expenditure on them. Given his unfamiliarity with this 
unpredictable new product, it is not surprising that computerization at HSBC during 
Saunders’s tenure as CEO took place exclusively within the boundaries of the firm. In order 
to learn more about which computer technology to adopt, Saunders set up a Methods & 
Research (M&R) unit to study the use of computer technologies.34 The creation of this 
advisory unit brought HSBC along the same lines as large British banks.35 In 1964, Saunders 
then assigned the task of supervising computerisation to Norman Howard Talbot Bennett 
(born 1921).  
Bennett, who was four years younger than Saunders, knew only slightly more about 
computers. He had begun his career with Barclays Bank in London and joined HSBC in 1946 
where he then held a number of posts in India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand over the 
next two decades. Bennett supervised the M&R team that negotiated the bank’s first contract 
with IBM in December 1965.36 A key point here is that Bennett had left the United Kingdom 
before the British banking industry began introducing electronic computers in the late 1950s. 
Bennett had, therefore, been isolated from these developments. It is probably that at the 
moment in 1964, when Bennett was given responsibility for managing HSBC’s adoption of 
computers, he had never seen an actual computer, as he had spent the last two decades living 
in developing countries in which this technology had yet to arrive. Moreover, Bennett also 
lacked any formal training in any of the academic disciplines, such as mathematics or 
engineering, that might have prepared him for work with calculating devices. Thus, while 
some British bankers were acquiring enough knowledge of computers to move into the 
epistemic community of “the computer literate,” Bennett was well outside the admittedly 
nebulous boundary of this social category. 
Bennett’s formal title changed on a number of occasions: in the four years after 1964 
he was successively Controller with Special Duties, Chief Manager’s Assistant, and then 
Assistant to the Chairman. Regardless of the changes in this title, his basic function remained 
the same: in the period between 1964 and 1970, Bennett’s focus was on managing 
computerisation. It appears that Bennett’s main source of information about computers was a 
friend who worked for the National Westminster Bank, a British domestic bank that had 
already migrated several administrative tasks to computers. 37 Bennett’s conversations with 
  
his friend, which likely took place during a holiday in the United Kingdom, appear to have 
represented the extent of his education with computer technology prior to his 1964 
appointment.  
 
 
Source: HSBC Archives (circa 1970) 
 
In Bennett’s view, the first major benefits HSBC derived from computerisation came 
from the December 1965 decision to link terminals in each branch to an IBM 360 computer 
in the headquarters via telephone lines. This important decision permitted “real time” on-line 
management of accounts. HSBC was not the first bank to link computers in branches via 
telephone lines, as a similar system had been adopted in 1961 by the Bowery Savings Bank in 
New York City. IBM’s Robert Osborn, a leading figure in the development of real-time 
computer systems, visited IBM’s Hong Kong office and met with Bennett and other HSBC 
staff in May 1965.38  HSBC executives were also aware that a consortium of New Zealand 
banks called Databank Systems Ltd was also working on a real-time system. Bennett flew to 
New Zealand and interviewed Databank CEO Gordon Hogg in the course of planning 
HSBC’s network.39 The Databank System went live in 1967, the same year the IBM 
mainframes were installed in HSBC’s headquarters and linked to terminals in the branches.40 
As was usual with IBM, “big blue” sent HSBC technical advisors to help with 
teething problems during installation.41 For instance, IBM’s staff helped HSBC to select 
promising clerical employees (many of whom were refugees from mainland China without 
  
secondary education), for training as computer programmers. IBM staff then helped to deliver 
the training needed to convert clerks into programmers. Bennett opined in 1980 that 
retraining of existing HSBC employees as programmers was important for HSBC’s 
computerisation drive.42 Instrumental to success, however, was also the hiring of three 
experienced personnel from the UK: the electronic data processing (EDP) Manager, Chief 
Analyst, Chief Programmer, who nurtured and led the inexperienced local staff to complete 
the project.43 
 
Source: HSBC Archives, 1975 
4 Episode 2: The Octopus System  
4.1 The market thickens in Hong Kong, 1970s-1990s 
The previous section argued that HSBC adopted computers in the late 1960s and early 
1970s primarily as a way of managing a growing number of savings accounts more 
effectively. About this process Bennett recollected that while computerisation had not 
deprived any HSBC worker of a livelihood, it had allowed the bank to reduce overtime and 
direct employees’ energies towards more profitable activities.44 At this point in time, the 
computer-literate population of Hong Kong consisted primarily if not exclusively of workers 
who had been trained to use a single proprietary system.  
In contrast to the story told in episode one, the level of knowledge about computers 
within and around Hong Kong’s banks rose significantly over the course of the next couple of 
decades. By the 1980s there were many highly-educated people familiar with both the 
fundamental principles of computing and a variety of hardware and software products. The 
markets for computer technology and computer expertise were much thicker, which permitted 
  
outsourcing45 and vertical disintegration. The technology was much less expensive and was 
better understood.  
To adopt Håkanson’s terminology, an epistemic community that included ICT  
professionals and managers in many Hong Kong firms had been formed. Higher education 
institutions played an important role in the creation of this inter-firm epistemic community by 
training young people with general computer skills. They were producing large numbers of 
computer science graduates who could be employed by firms to help them to understand and 
manage these technologies, which no longer seemed exotic. For instance, the University of 
Hong Kong (UHK), an English-language institution, offered instruction in computers to 
students in a variety of disciplines from 1967 onwards using an IBM 1620.46 In 1968, the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) began offering courses in computer 
programming.  The CUHK established a full-fledged Department of Computer Science in 
1973 and began offering a degree in Computer Science in 1978.47 In 1970, UHK and CUHK 
began inter-organization cooperation in computing with the establishment of the Joint 
Universities Computer Centre (JUCC). Computer lessons became part of the secondary 
school curriculum in the early 1980s.48  
The Hong Kong Computer Society (HKCS) also helped to create an epistemic 
community of ICT professionals that extended across the boundaries of firms. The HKCS 
was established in 1970 through the cooperative efforts of HSBC, IBM, and other large 
companies.49 In 1970, HSBC was represented on the board of the HKSC by two executives, 
including J.P. Rastello, the manager of the bank’s data processing centre.50 Many of the 
founders of the HKCS were expatriates, although it soon acquired a large number of Chinese 
members.51 The HKCS took steps to promote greater awareness of computers by the other 
specialists and the general public. For instance, in 1970, Rastello publicly declared that Hong 
Kong urgently needed more computer programmers and urged cooperation by various 
stakeholders to achieve this goal.52 Echoing Rastello’s sentiment and in direct response to 
increased demand for knowledge about computers in Hong Kong, the HKSC began 
publishing a newsletter. In 1974, the HKCS formed a Computer Audit Club with the Hong 
Kong Society of Accountants.53  After 1978, the HKSC actively facilitated the exchange of 
knowledge about computers between individuals in different firms and other organizations 
through an annual convention.  
  
Over the course of the 1970s, a growing number of firms and individuals in a variety 
of Hong Kong industries began using computers, either by purchasing their own devices or 
contracting the work out to computer service bureaux. The latter appeared as early as 1970 
when HSBC and Standard Chartered began to offer these services to their business 
customers.54 The middle years of the decade appear to have been an inflection point for the 
development of epistemic communities ICT professionals and computer-literature managers 
in Hong Kong. A study by Eric Kwong-kay Lo, on the number of computers deployed across 
Hong Kong’s industries in the mid-1970s, estimated that the number of computers in use in 
Hong Kong’s large businesses increased from 119 at the end of 1975 to 266 at the end of 
1977.55 The same study also suggested that the adoption of computers did not occur at a 
uniform rate in all sectors of the colony’s economy. In banking and public utilities, which had 
adopted computers in the 1960s, the annual rate of increase in the number of computers was 
modest compared to that in the ship construction, chemical, and architectural sectors, where 
firms acquired computers at a much higher rate in the period 1975-7. Mr Lo’s study implies 
that small retail establishments and restaurants in Hong Kong did not experience any 
computerisation in this span of years. 
Verifying Mr Lo’s estimates of computer penetration levels is difficult, as Hong 
Kong’s government generated few statistics about computer sales or usage in this period.56 
As a result, we cannot systematically compare the competitiveness of the colony’s ICT 
markets across time or with those of other jurisdictions. Anecdotal evidence, however, allows 
us to infer that Hong Kong’s market for computer components became highly competitive in 
the 1980s. For instance, in 1984, Hong Kong had a thriving market for legitimate and pirate 
computer components for Apple II and IBM PC systems.57 We know that the number of 
computer vendors increased dramatically in Hong Kong during the 1980s, when specialised 
shopping districts for computer components emerged. The most important of these was the 
area that came to be known as the Mongkok Computer Centre.58 At the same time, Hong 
Kong’s Golden Arcade emerged as a centre for PC-clone distributors and software vendors.59 
In a 1992 article about the Golden Arcade, a South China Morning Post reporter noted the 
intensively competitive nature of the market, which was characterised as a “Darwinian 
bloodfest… competition is cut-throat and margins razor-thin.”60 This colourful language 
indicates that markets had become quite thick. By 1990, Hong Kong’s Trade Development 
Council discussed “the increasing commoditization of personal computers, peripherals and 
even facsimile machines.”61 
  
All of these developments in Hong Kong were, of course, influenced by global 
developments in the broad field of information and communication technologies.62 During 
this period, the epistemic communities that worked with computers underwent changes that 
correspond to the processes of articulation and replication identified by Håkanson. These 
developments facilitated the shift in the way in which retail banking technology was 
operationalized in Hong Kong: no longer was the entire process done within the boundaries 
of a single firm, now looser networks were used. This new approach was exemplified by the 
Octopus system. 
4.2 The Octopus system and the big problem of small change 
By the 1990s, computers were a fact of life in firms in many Hong Kong industries. It 
was in this context that the inter-firm network known as the “Octopus system” emerged. 
Launched in 1997, it rapidly grew to become the preferred solution for “micro-payments” in 
Hong Kong. Many consider the success of Octopus as a decisive step of the colony’s 
transition to a cashless society. 63 
 The origins of Octopus lie in the fact that, like retail banks, public transport authorities 
face the problem of dealing with a very high volume of standardised transactions. Early 
computer systems were inadequate for such tasks.64  This limitation was overcome with the 
advent of Tandem’s so called “non-stop” computing and the development of fault resilient 
systems by other manufacturers during the 1980s. Prior to the advent of such systems, 
transport authorities in many countries had been to automate fare collection by using 
cardboard tickets with a magnetic stripe.65  In Hong Kong, the magnetic stripe ticketing 
system was introduced in 1979 on the Mass Transport Railway (MTR) Corporation’s subway 
network.66 In 1983, the MTR introduced the Common Stored Value Ticket (CSVT) to 
supplement single journey passes. Regular commuters could then purchase fixed value 
magnetic stripe cards that could be used until the balance on the card was depleted, thus 
allowing for multiple journeys in a single ticket. The CSVT both improved customer service 
and reduced the number of coins the company was required to handle.67 
 By the early 1990s, MTR’s CSVT tickets could be used on the Kowloon-Canton 
Railway (KCR), a separate company. Bus companies began adopting the system in 1989, 
giving customers another place to spend value stored on their CSVT ticket.68     
 
 
 
  
Title: Octopus chip reader in public transport 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (n/d)69 
 
4.3 Birth of the Octopus system 
 In 1992, MTR executives began searching for a replacement to the CSVT system which 
had technical problems that included a fault rate of 1 for every 2,500 transactions.70 These 
faults were costly in a system handling some two million transactions a day.  Chip-based card 
technology looked as an attractive proposition. Its commercial application had been 
pioneered by France Telecom in the 1980s.71 This near-field technology72 offered ease of use 
and speed: fulfilling transactions within 300ms without having to actually touch readers.73 
Transactions were accurate and there were safeguards against fraud. End-of-day account 
settlement reduced human counting errors and bank settlement time. The MTR executives 
decided that it made sense to introduce the new solution across the public transport systems 
(ferries, trains, subway, taxi, bus, min-bus, trams) operated by different companies.74 This 
plan required bringing together competing transport operators to collaborate on a single 
payment scheme. In other words, a precondition of Octopus was establishing a community 
that cooperated across firm boundaries to articulate a common payment standard. Octopus 
was possible because inter-firm epistemic communities of ICT professionals and computer-
literate managers with a common terminology and references had emerged in Hong Kong by 
this point.  
 In 1994, five major public transport operators namely, the two rail lines, MTR and 
KCRC, bus companies KMB and Citybus; and the Hongkong and Yaumatei Ferry (HYF), 
established a joint venture, “Creative Star Limited” (renamed as “Octopus Cards Limited” in 
2002, henceforth Octopus), to oversee the contactless smartcard system's development and 
implementation.75 This “organizational and governance structure… gave all players (no 
  
matter how small) a very significant say [in the development of the payments solution].”76 
Professional service provider Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) helped to design the 
governance structure. PwC also acted as intermediary with the banks, who transferred critical 
technical knowledge to Octopus that allowed the new network to be linked back to the pre-
established payments ecosystem.  For consumers, this meant that funds could be transferred 
easily and electronically from bank accounts to Octopus cards. 
 
Title: Vending machine activated by Octopus chip 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (n/d)77 
 
 The Octopus card debuted in 1997. The hardware was partially purchased “off the 
shelf”, partly developed in-house. For instance, while Octopus adopted Sony’s smartcard 
technology, it developed most of its terminals in-house.78  The software resulted from a 
combination of in-house development and ready-made packages. Rail and underground 
passengers already accustomed to stored value cards with the CSVT readily accepted the new 
payment solution.79 In 2000, the owners of Hong Kong’s six million Octopus chips acquired 
the ability to use them on 4,100 buses owned by small and big operators. This extension of 
the payment network was followed by acceptance by the 600 or so companies running mini-
buses.  
 In yet another sign of articulation across firms, Octopus-compatible readers began to 
the connected to machines owned by companies that were not part of the consortium that had 
created the Octopus system. Vending machines inside stations and then shops and restaurants 
  
allowed users to spend value stored on the Octopus cards on products other than transport. In 
2002, Octopus payments for non-transport uses amounted to HK$1.1 billion, or 6% of all 
Octopus transactions. By 2010, Octopus payments for non-transport had risen to HK$15 
billion, or 61% of all Octopus transactions.80  
  By 2011 there were 5,000 readers deployed across 3,000 different merchants accepting 
payment through Octopus.81 In that year, there were 23 million Octopus chips in circulation. 
On average, each card was used eleven times per day, with the average value per transaction 
being $HK9.00 (approximately US$1.16).82 Moreover, each card’s unique identifier enabled 
its use as a personal identification device. Designated individuals could thus use their cards to 
activate lifts in the lobby of the International Financial Centre, book and pay for public tennis 
courts and swimming pools, or even enter a keyless private residence.83   
 
Title: Access to apartment building activated by Octopus chip 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (n/d)84 
 
5 Conclusion  
In the 1960s, the first computers were installed in Hong Kong banks. The first section 
of this article documented the introduction of these technologies was largely done within the 
boundaries of firms: executives at firms such as HSBC decided not to develop cooperative 
networks involving other banks. One benefit of this approach was that it increased the bank’s 
degree of self-reliance. HSBC’s approach was influenced by the fact the relevant markets for 
computer components and ICT skills were then quite thin in Hong Kong. Moreover, while 
managers in Hong Kong financial institutions anticipated that computers were important, they 
were unfamiliar with the technology, which was novel, very expensive, and only poorly 
  
understood by managers, most of whom had grown to adulthood before the Second World 
War.  
By the 1980s and 1990s, the situation in Hong Kong had changed and now permitted 
sub-contracting and extensive outsourcing. By this point, the local markets for computer 
technology and computer expertise were much thicker. The storage and processing capacity 
of computers had grown exponentially while, at the same time, they were much cheaper (in 
nominal prices). Moreover, the human capital needed to effect this transition had become less 
scarce, thanks in part of the advent of computer science courses in Hong Kong universities. 
The epistemic community of relevant ICT professionals now included individuals working a 
wide range of Hong Kong firms. These developments facilitated the shift in the way in which 
retail banking technology was operationalized in Hong Kong: no longer was the entire 
process done within the boundaries of a single firm, now looser networks, such as the 
Octopus system, were used. The industrial organization of cashless payment technology in 
Hong Kong changed in part because of the growing size of the relevant epistemic 
community: by the 1990s, the epistemic community in question had expanded to include 
individual in a wide variety of non-financial companies, most notably the public transport 
operator. The creation of this epistemic community was, as this paper has shown, a 
precondition of the success of the Octopus payment system.  
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